Переводы Переводы

Loyalty to the Anti-Russian Course is the Only Ticket to Power in the Baltics

Автор:
Andrey Starikov

The idea of holding back Russia has become the cornerstone of the Baltic republics’ political systems, the people in charge no longer matter. Lithuania’s Farmers and Green Union party that won the elections accepted the general line of thought, even though they promised an alternative; the “pro-Russian” Estonian Centre Party which is now in charge of the government also took the pledge to the old views. The executives change, but the policy remains unchanged. Fighting Russia is the rite of passage in power.

Estonian PM Jüri Ratas spoke in favour of dialogue with Russia. During his meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on 9 March in Brussels, the leader of the Centre Party and head of government declared that he outright demands negotiations with Moscow. A Pragmatic? No, just another “suppresser.” The main topic of this dialogue, according to Ratas, must be the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, as well as Georgia and Moldova.”

“I have lived during the times of occupation and I know what it is like. Freedom has its price.” stated the Estonian PM with all of the accompanying pathos.

For the Baltics this price is quite clear – 2% of their GDP going into defense. For this sum, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania get to house three multinational NATO battalions on their territory and various other perks: war games, the Alliance’s infrastructure, new sites, various symbolic guarantees of defense and subtle diplomatic nods of approval.

When meeting the NATO Secretary General, Ratas traditionally reported on his budget. “Defense spending in Estonia makes up 2.17% of the GDP, last week I proposed to parliament that we maintain an amount no less than 2% for the following 4 years...

…And that sum also grows with spending on accepting allied forces and the 60 million defense investment program,” said the prime minister, “Freedom is never just taken for granted and without a price.”

Jüri Ratas and Jens Stoltenberg

Repeating the sweet word “freedom” many times, it seems Ratas was trying to convince himself, that that was what you call housing an foreign military contingent in Estonia, which is outside of its national jurisdiction.

Such a “freedom” costs the smallest of the Baltic republics (in relative terms) more than it does for any other East European NATO member.

But their Baltic neighbors are catching up to them. By 2018, Riga and Vilnius expect to get their military budgets to the 2% GDP and don’t plan on stopping there. “It does not say anywhere that when you reach 2% GDP in military spending, that you must stop,” said Latvian Defense Minister Raimonds Bergmanis, talking of his hopes at a further increase in spending. Lithuanian ruling elites however agreed to raise military spending to 2.5% GDP by 2020.

The Baltics have an incurable case of “suppressing” Russia. And this is no longer just tactical necessity, and not a “as you wish” stance looking to appease the Administration of former US president Obama, but strategic choice.

Jüri Ratas’ predecessor, the former Estonian PM Taavi Rõivas (Reform Party) managed to outline the idea of Baltic militarism. The Baltic countries must become a territory of deterrence for Russia, and this deterrence itself must become a “new normality” for the Western world, said the politician in an interview to the German Die Welt.

In November of last year, Estonia retired Rõivas. He left, the Reform Party moved to the opposition, but the “deterrence” idea remains. The anti-Russian course is led by the “Centre” – “agents of the Kremlin” and “United Russia’s allies”, which have suddenly found themselves to be the core of the new ruling coalition.

Nor the voices of the Russian-speaking voters, not the cooperation agreement with the main Russian party stop them from “suppressing” Moscow. Such is the price of power in their political system, which is built upon anti-Russian views.

Playing the role of the ruling party will kill the Centre’s popularity. In February, Jüri Ratas’ political strength already dropped in 2% of its rating, compared to the previous month. Not all of the Russian-speaking voters are ready to support the party in its new image of being the leading “deterrents” of Russia. Ratas’ ambitions run risk of destroying Edgar Savisaar’s political project – the Estonian Centre Party.

The same anti-Russian rules are now part of Lithuania’s new party in power – Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union. While not accumulating the national minorities’ votes, the Lithuanian “green farmers” still proposed an alternative policy to the voters.

They focused on economy, but, according to them, the economy of the Republic is intimately tied to Vilnius’ anti-Russian foreign policy. Geography is not party membership, you can’t change it.
Ramūnas Karbauskis

The voters trusted the Green Farmer party and they won, but the policy remained the same. Russia and Belarus must be viewed the same way as the previous government viewed them, according to the party’s leader Ramūnas Karbauskis. In February, the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union popularity dropped by 4.6%.

Latvia also joined the long election cycle – with the municipal elections coming this June and the parliamentary elections in Autumn 2018. Riga mayor Nils Ušakovs as the leader of the Lithuanian analogue to the Centre party – the social-democratic Harmony Party, which gets the Russian-speaking votes, has stated that they need to come to power in a year.

Nils Ušakovs

The Harmony Party has strong support and the municipal elections could be a nice start for the parliamentary race, and the range of political parties that can get into the Saeima has increased, so the claim is not unfounded. But one should warn Ušakovs of the Estonian experience.

The “Russian” party entering a coalition with anti-Russian views is a political trap and an easy way to forever lose the Russian-speaking voters.

Maybe it is best to sit it out in opposition, than go the Ratas way, betraying the voters in favour of a few years in power.


Translated by Pavel Shamshiev
Статья доступна на других языках: