In early February, the Donald Trump Administration presented its vision of USA’s nuclear policy (Nuclear Posture Review, NPR 2018), which is a formalized written version of the recent 180 turn of America’s strategy in this field.
During the later years of the Cold War, USA were seriously and seemingly quite sincerely concerned with radically decreasing the nuclear arsenal stockpiles. Whichever was the main motivation: a desire to save money on the maintenance of the immense supply accumulated over decades of the arms race, a fear that the USSR will “lose” a part of its arsenals, or the desire to solidify their supremacy in conventional weapons – is no longer important.
In September 1991, US President George H Bush proposed a unilateral withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons unto national territory for storage and further disposal. Later this was supported by USSR President Gorbachev and afterwards by Russian President Yeltsin and went down in history as the “presidential initiatives.”
These informal, legally nonbinding proposals led to a wide scale decrease in nuclear arsenals: whole types of nuclear weapons were decommissioned (for example, nuclear artillery rounds or Special Atomic Demolition Munition). For the following decade, USA only had the B61 aerial bombs as their non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Despite their significant drop in European stockpiles, they are not completely withdrawn, and around 180 units are stored on NATO bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey. The stockpiles of such bombs in USA are in centralized storage. The Army and Navy also lost their “own” nuclear weapons (aside from the Trident II ballistic missiles on submarines, of course), including not just Navy Air Force bombs, but also nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles.
Russia also took measure to decrease the immense Soviet stockpiles. For obvious reasons, those stockpiles are all on Russian territory. Detailed information on Russian tactical nukes is top secret, so there are no open sources on the issue. Russia rather enjoys the West’s perception of Russian supremacy in this field, because it sobers up those who dream of supremacy in conventional weapons.
It is considered that Russia has reduced around 3/4 of Soviet stockpiles. According to leading foreign experts (Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris Russian nuclear forces, 2017) the modern Russian arsenal is less than 2000 units, all in centralized stockpiles.
And unlike USA, the weapon types and variety remains.
Overdue issue
As a whole, during the short period of stability of the monopolar world order in, USA have become sort of the metaphorical white elephant: they need to keep it as the regalia of a superpower, but they don’t really want to waste money on maintaining it. During the time after the USSR’s collapse, the only new nuclear weapon in USA is the B61-11 bomb, refashioned from old B61-7s in small numbers and made for destruction of extremely fortified underground targets. Its adoption allowed them to decommission the old high yield B53 bombs (up to 9 megaton), which were not up to modern safety standards.
During the decrease in strategic arms as part of the Russia-US agreements, the priority was, peculiarly, on the more modern systems, due to their high maintenance costs.
Thus, the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) LGM‑118A Peacekeeper and the long range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) AGM‑129A were decommissioned. The remaining ones are the land-based LGM‑30G Minuteman III ICBMs, which have been on watch since the 70s, and the bombs and AGM‑86B ALCMs from the 80s.
The main and most modern tools in USA’s nuclear deterrence are the submarine based UGM‑133 Trident II ballistic missiles, on 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines.
The deterioration of the delivery system made the modernization process of the American nuclear triad imminent.
The main bulk of the update plan was formed during Barack Obama’s second presidential term.
· To replace the 14 Ohio-class submarines with 12 Columbia-class ones. The financing of the project and construction prep is already underway. The Navy is expecting the have the first submarine out on patrol in 2030. In the foreseeable future (before the 2040s) they will be armed with Trident IIs.
· The prospective strategic bomber to replace the B-52H and B-1B (which can’t carry nuclear weapons). The LRS-B programme selected the Northrop Grumman project codenamed B-21 Raider. The Air Force plans to make no less than 100 bombers and achieve operational completion of the first of those in the mid-2020s, which is very optimistic.
· Considering how outdated the AGM‑86B ALCM are, there are plans to develop a prospective missile on the LRSO programme. Preliminary projects are underway. In 2022, there is choice between prototypes between Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. The appearance of the missile is currently unknown.
· Replacing Minuteman III with the GBSD programme is at a similar stage with Boeing and Northrop Grumman in trials. The missiles are to be on guard in 2029-2030 and to replace Minuteman III with enough numbers to support 400 active ICBMs.
It should be noted that such a colossal amount of work, which has to be done simultaneously (their own fault as they let the work build up), has started a lot discussions among politicians and experts. The most criticism went to the LRSO and GBSD programmes, with the most common complaint being that missiles on submarines with stealth bomber support is enough for deterrence. However, the escalation of the international scene helped the “hawks” and according to the NPR 2018, both programmes will be supported in full.
If the modernization of the strategic triad was a done deal, then tactical nukes are in for some revolutionary changes.
Primed!
In the 90s, tactical nuclear weapons were treated more like an outdated Cold War concept that was to be done away with due to cost and security. However, when it became clear that Fukuyama’s End of History was postponed for an undetermined date and the competition between the large military powers is escalating, USA decided they overdid it a bit. Thus, the US decided that weakening their arsenal of tactical nukes, they removed a few steps from under themselves in the conflict escalation ladder, so to say.
Most frequently, foreign experts and military officials talk about this using the example of the hypothetical, but completely “inescapable”, conflict of Russia and NATO over the Baltics (and judging by the tenacity of which this issue is hyped up, this conflict is postponed because Russia still doesn’t see any reason to actually go and conquer the Baltics.)
The following scenario became commonly accepted as an axiom: that after the quick operation to take over the needed territory, Moscow, not wanting to be drawn into a long war with Alliance, will use the “escalation for de-escalation” strategy and demonstrably use a tactical nuke. This will on one hand raise the stakes in the conflict and on the other hand, not do something that will inevitably lead to retaliatory strike from the whole US nuclear triad.
And the Western Bloc, more weak in this aspect, will not be able to answer this. And afterwards, depending of the text’s aim, the author will either use this to justify keeping the “All-NATO” B61 bomb stockpile in Europe, either demand modernizing the tactical nukes, because normal bombs in a conflict with a capable opponent are an inefficient delivery system.
Let‘s be honest, the scale and madness of the scenario where Moscow, in order to take over the Baltics, will start throwing nukes at NATO are truly impressive. However, the people behind it are not that important.
If need be, this scenario can easily substitute China instead of Russia, and Taiwan instead of the Baltics, and it would not be any worse (if that’s even possible) – but it is not politically sound to talk and write about that. As it usually is with USA, they are assigning their own political and strategic views to their opponents (the “escalation for de-escalation” strategy fits with what the Kennedy Administration did at the Cuban Crisis; Trump’s foreign policy is also characterized as such in the US), which contrast with the excessive efforts for disarmament.
And less pleasantly, alongside the expected rivalry with Russia and China, there are completely new threats in the new age. Mostly this denotes DPRK, which combines some traits that are unfathomable to US foreign policy: the status of third world country, a policy critically negative towards USA and the capability to cause unacceptable damage with its own nuclear weapons if a conflict would arise. According to a significant part of US politicians, Iran is seeking similar capabilities.
To be continued.
Translated by Pavel Shamshiev